Researcher(s)
- Sophie Levine, Philosophy, University of Delaware
Faculty Mentor(s)
- Richard Hanley, Philosophy, University of Delaware
Abstract
This paper examines the legal implications of the vagueness of abortion. People have never been able to come together to a consensus on whether abortion is moral, or more specifically, write up a guideline for when an abortion can or cannot be performed in any certain case. This is important now more than ever since Roe v. Wade has been overturned and women’s reproductive rights hang in the balance. Now that it is not compulsory that all 50 states permit abortions, only 29 states have maintained its legality; 14 have banned abortion and 7 are in a limbo situation. Accumulating research from the different works of many philosophers, this inspection demonstrates that a decision must be made on an all-or-nothing attitude when it comes to reproductive law if a guideline cannot be reached.
Vagueness is an important problem in philosophy, semantics, metaphysics, and logic. A predicate term is considered vague if it has borderline, or indeterminate cases. An example of this is the term “oak tree” because it has a stage where it is determinately an oak tree and a stage where it is determinately not an oak tree (when it is an acorn for example), and there is no definitive border between the two. Under the right conditions and after a period of time an acorn may develop into an oak tree, just like a fertilized egg to a person. Vagueness is a problem for the law because when a decision must be made one way or the other, there needs to be a non-arbitrary process used to come to a conclusion about which side of any particular case should be given the benefit of the doubt. In the case of abortion, should the benefit of the doubt be given to the pregnant person or the developing fetus?