Two-Sided Electricity Auction Mechanism Incorporating X2G

Researcher(s)

  • Christopher Sepka, Computer Engineering, University of California, Berkeley

Faculty Mentor(s)

  • Danielle Lee, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Delaware
  • Mark Nejad, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Delaware

Abstract

This paper presents a two-sided market system for the commerce of electric resources between connected Energy Storage Systems (ESS). In the proposed system, buyers and sellers submit private bids in second-price auctions where bids from buyers come exponentially over time, as opposed to sellers. The maximum optimal matching between buyers and sellers is infeasible due to the substantial computational load and unreliable predictions of future bids; instead, we utilize several greedy algorithms practical to real-time applications and provide approximate solutions to the Online Scheduling and Pricing (OSAP) problem. Several experiments with stochastically generated bids from buyers and sellers demonstrate that MOSAP-II and MOSAP-III show the highest performances in the auction setup.